Friday, June 6, 2008

"The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States" by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison


A book of beautiful and pure political philosophy. The version I've used is "The Modern Library Classics" edition. I know it would have been easier for me to put down the numbers of the corresponding letter instead of the page number, but I'm too lazy.

"Of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants." p. 6

"It is easy to see that jealousies and uneasiness may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they should regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference or composure." p. 19

"Union and a good national government [is] necessary to put and keep [other countries] in such a situation as, instead of inviting war, will tend to repress and discourage it." (emphasis in original) p. 19

"Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institution which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free." p. 42

"As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed." p. 55

"Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint." p. 91

"It will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities, than for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities." p. 101

"For it is a truth, which the experience of ages has attended, that the people are commonly most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion." p.153

Regarding the defense of the people against a too-powerful government, and relating to the 2nd amendment: "If circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude, that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens ... who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens."

"Let us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our option; that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition of others ... To judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquility, would be to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character." (emphasis mine) p. 203

"The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people, by persons of each class, is altogether visionary." p. 210

"It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have some of their own number in the representative body, in order that their feelings and interests may be the better understood and attended to. But we have seen that this will never happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of the people free." p. 211

"It might be demonstrated that the most productive system of finance will always be the least burdensome." p. 213

"I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon, which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed for the general defence and security." p. 220

"The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people, by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during this short peropod the trust should be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands." p. 224

"It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it.l It is not necessary that the former should be perfect; it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect." p. 236

"What color of propriety could the force necessary for defence be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offence? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set the bounds to the assertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own government." p. 257

"This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves his country, every man who loves liberty, out to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment to the Union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it." p. 260 (emphasis mine)

"It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation." p. 268

"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite... The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments in times of peace and security." p. 298

More on the importance of citizens bearing arms in The Federalist No. 46

"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." (emphasis mine) p. 331

"It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part." p. 333

"If it be true...that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend." p. 341

"No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgement a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate." p. 344

"In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob." p. 356

"The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common food of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust." p. 365

"Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States." p. 366

"Every government out to contain in itself the means of its own preservation." (emphasis in the original) p. 378

"It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm union of this country, under an efficient government, will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of Europe; and that enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues of foreign powers, and will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by some of them." p. 383

"It is a just observation, that the people commonly intend the public good. This often applies to their very errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator who should pretend that they always reason right about the means of promoting it." p. 458

"[It should be] admitted that the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct; or that the best security for the fidelity of mankind if to make their interest coincide with their duty." p. 464

"[It would be wise to] consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things in the same state in which they happen to be at any givern period, as much more likely to do good han harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the system of legislation." p. 471

"The remark is unquestionably just, that an hereditary monarch, though often the oppressor of his people, has personally too much at stake in the government to be in any material danger of being corrupted by foreign powers. But a man raised from the station of a private citizen to the rank of chief magistrate, possessed of a moderate or slender fortune, and looking forward to a period not very remote when he may probably be obliged to return to the station from which he was taken, might sometimes be under temptations to sacrifice his duty to interest, which it would require superlative virtue to withstand." p. 480

"The creation of crimes after the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the subjecting of men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breached of no law, and the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny." p. 548

"I never expect to see a perfect work from an imperfect man." p. 561

"the establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of the whole people, is a prodigy, to the completion of which I look forward." p. 565

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